AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY by Konou, Comlanvi Martin
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Dissertations, Theses, and Student Research 
from the College of Business Business, College of 
Summer 8-5-2013 
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY 
Comlanvi Martin Konou 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/businessdiss 
 Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Econometrics Commons, Economic 
Theory Commons, Growth and Development Commons, and the International Economics Commons 
Konou, Comlanvi Martin, "AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY" (2013). Dissertations, Theses, and Student Research from the College of 
Business. 42. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/businessdiss/42 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Student Research from the 
College of Business by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
 AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 
 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY 
 
 
by 
 
 
Comlanvi M. Konou 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty of 
 
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements 
 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
Major: Economics 
 
 
 
Under the Supervision of Professor Hendrik Van Den Berg 
 
 
 
Lincoln, Nebraska 
 
August, 2013 
 AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY 
Comlanvi M. Konou, Ph.D. 
   University of Nebraska, 2013 
Advisor: Hendrik Van Den Berg 
 
Ongoing debates about the adoption of the agricultural biotechnology in the developing 
countries and EU have dominated the literature in development economics and 
biosciences. This dissertation considers some environmental, economic and social 
consequences of the technology from three perspectives: 1) the impact of the ongoing 
pest density on the performance of the agricultural biotechnology in India; 2) trade 
consequences of EU restrictive trade policies towards biotech products; and 3) the 
adoption decision of the technology in the EU and the developing economies. 
Agricultural biotechnology appears to be successful in increasing yield and reducing the 
use of pesticides. However, most studies fail to consider the dynamic effect of the pest 
population.  Pests are getting more resistant to the biotech seeds. I use a stochastic 
production function to capture the impacts of inputs on the mean of the output and the 
effect of pest density on the variability of the output. The results show that, due to the 
presence of new pests, the productivity of the damage control inputs such as biotech 
seeds and the insecticides decreases. 
  
 The ban on the agricultural biotechnology products by the European countries has 
affected trade flows between EU and its trading partners. I use the international-trade-
gravity-model to assess the trade impacts of EU policies towards agricultural 
biotechnology products. The results show trade creation in the Food and Live Animals 
category. However trade diversion was found in the Beverages and Tobacco and Animal 
and Vegetable Oils and Fats categories. 
 Using a general equilibrium and comparative statics analyses, I determine the 
impact of the enforcement of the Intellectual Property Rights, consumers’ preferences 
and externalities on the production of biotech crops. The results show that efficient 
production of biotech crops under the influence of these three factors is contingent upon 
the output elasticity of capital in both biotech and non-biotech productions, total factor 
productivity in biotech production, and the ratio of the proportions of the biotech and 
non-biotech products consumed by each consumer
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND ISSUES OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
 
 Modern biotechnology encompasses a variety  of methods for modifying living 
organisms according to the purposes of the scientists. The technology’s application across 
medical, pharmaceutical, chemical, environmental and agricultural uses is spreading 
quickly across the globe. While biotechnology is accepted in other sectors, agricultural 
biotechnology, which is known as GMOs, is encountering some obstacles in various 
countries. Agricultural biotechnology can be put into three categories:  production-trait 
applications, output-trait applications and bioengineered products applications (Brenner, 
1998). The most common production-trait applications are herbicide tolerance and insect 
resistance which have been developed for extensive use in crops cultivation. Moschini et 
al., 1999, described herbicide tolerance crops as being modified with a gene found in a oil 
bacterium that allows plants to metabolize herbicides. Insect resistant varieties of maize, 
cotton, soybean and wheat, have been genetically modified to generate pesticidal 
property of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) that produces a protein toxic to certain insects 
(Harlander, 1993). 
 Agricultural production has always been risky, and characterized by large annual 
variations in crop yield. The risks to the yield can originate from weather (drought, 
floods, hail and frost), from soil conditions (salinity, nitrogen depletion and erosion), 
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from disease (rot, fungal and rust), and from pests (bacteria, viruses, nematodes, insects 
and animals). North America scientists made the breakthrough by developing GM-crop 
varieties to reduce production risks. For instance, new GM varieties of conventional 
crops have been created with higher degree of stress tolerance to ecological conditions 
and with a higher degree of resistance to pests and disease (Isaac, 2002). 
 The adoption and the commercialization of biotech crops have  reached several 
countries around the World. Biotech crops were first commercialized in 1996. Biotech 
crop hectares increased by an unprecedented 100–fold from 1.7 million hectares in 1996, 
to over 170 million hectares in 2012 (Clives, 2012). In 2012, the number of hectare of 
biotech crops grew at an annual growth rate of 6%, up 10.3 million from 160 hectares in 
2011. Figure 1.1 shows that the growth rate of biotech crops increase faster in developing 
countries than industrial countries from the year 2010. In 2012, growth rate for biotech 
crops was at least three times as fast, and five times as large in developing countries, at 
11% or 8.7 million hectares, versus 3% or 1.6 hectares in industrial countries (Clive, 
2012). 
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Figure 1.1: Trend of biotech hectarage of developing and industrial countries 
 
Source: James, Clive. 2012. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2012. ISAAA Brief No. 44 
 According to 2012 report of ISAAA, developing countries grew more, 52%, of 
global biotech crops in 2012 than industrial countries at 48%. Of the 28 countries which 
planted biotech crops in 2012, 20 were developing countries and 8 were industrial 
countries.  In 2012, Sudan and Cuba have adopted Bt cotton and Bt maize, respectively.  
The number of farmers growing biotech crops was 17.3 million farmers in 2012, up 0.6 
million from 2011(See Figure 1.2 below). 
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Figure 1.2: Developing versus Industrial Biotech Countries 
 
 
Source: James, Clive. 2012. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2012. ISAAA Brief No. 44 
 
 The technology is widely used in the US with 69.5 million hectares and an 
average of 90% adoption across all crops. Brazil takes the second place for the fourth 
consecutive year with a record increase of 21% from 2011 (from 6.3 million to 36.6 
million). With 23.9 million hectares, Argentina kept its third place, followed by Canada 
with 11.8 million hectares. India with its 10.8 million of hectares of Bt cotton took the 
fifth place. In Africa, only Sudan, South Africa, Burkina Faso and Egypt are currently 
planting biotech crops. 
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Figure 1.3: Non-Biotech and Biotech adopting Countries 
 
 
 Biotech:  Green/ Non-Biotech: Yellow 
Source: James, Clive. 2012. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2012. ISAAA Brief No. 44 
 
 As shown in Figure 1.3 above, the agricultural biotechnology is widely used in 
the North America than any other parts of the world. Since the technology is highly 
embedded with economic implications (Isaac, 2002), its substantial use in the North 
America where the enforcement of the IPRs is very effective, makes more sense. A place 
like Africa where the enforcement of the IPRs does not exists; the adoption rate of the 
technology is very low.  In other words, the lack of effective regulatory system in small 
and poor countries continues to be the major constraint to adoption (Clives, 2012). 
Despite the increasing adoption rate of the agricultural biotechnology, consumers still 
express some reluctance regarding the products. Some consumers express economic, 
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human safety and health, biodiversity, moral, ethical and religious concerns about biotech 
products.  Consumer acceptance is critical for the future of biotech agriculture. For 
example, Monsanto’s shares dropped from US$ 51 in May to US$ 38 October 1999, 
because shareholders are concerned about consumers’attitudes towards GM crops (Public 
Ledger 1999a).Consumer acceptance has been a key issue for various groups  active in 
the development of biotech crops. 
 According to economic theory, if the use of GM crops reduces the relative price 
of agricultural goods, consumers will purchase more, so long as agricultural goods are 
normal.   The economic concerns of the consumer regarding biotech crops may be 
viewed in broader perspectives. For example, a high concentration of research capacity, 
providing well-paying jobs, may have positive impact on the consumer acceptance. On 
the other hand, consumers may perceive that most of the benefits go to the large, private, 
multinational firms commercializing GM crops, with no benefit to them. This kind of 
perception among consumers may have negative impact on consumer acceptance of the 
technology. 
 With respect to human safety and health concerns, consumers are afraid of getting 
sick in the long- run after the consumption of biotech products.  Specifically, the concern 
is that toxigenic, pathogenic, infective or invasive changes to the plant may affect human 
health and safety (Isaac, 2002).These concerns will have negative impact on consumer 
acceptance of GM crops.  
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 Biodiversity concerns are also raised among consumers; the issue is that farmers 
producing herbicide-resistant GM crops will apply herbicides in a reckless, irresponsible 
manner in order to control weeds. By doing so, they can harm diversity and contaminate 
ground water. With that in mind, some consumers will refrain from purchasing GM 
crops. Moral and ethical concerns of GM technologies are raised by the fact that many 
private firm scientists advocates for the use of GM crops solely to enhance their own 
monetary rewards.  Indeed, the owners of the technology deserve some compensation, 
but the compensation must be limited by some moral and ethical boundaries. Private 
leadership of the GM technology has raised several questions among consumers. For 
example, Ho (1998) argues that the shift from public leadership in research on 
biotechnology to private leadership is associated with several substantial problems. The 
profit- seeking motives behind innovative attitudes towards GM technologies fail to 
address public interest. The public interest comes into play only when it comes to 
commercialization. Therefore, given the profit motives, private scientists can no longer 
be trusted to act in a moral and socially ethical manner.  
 After exploring current issues surrounding the agricultural biotechnology, I 
construct this dissertation which comprises three essays. In the first essay, the impact of 
the proliferation of new pests on biotech crops yield was considered. The performance of 
the technology was evaluated in India using the stochastic production function in order to 
capture yield risks caused by the additional applications of pesticides due the presence of 
the secondary pests such as aphids and jassids. 
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 In order to consider the impact of consumer acceptance of GM technologies, I 
extend the dissertation to the second essay which deals with the EU preferences and 
policies towards GM crops. The idea is to determine trade related consequences of such 
policies which are significantly affected by consumer preferences. I found strong 
evidence that EU restrictive trade policies have caused trade diversion in the import flows 
from the Rest of the World. Trade creation was also found.   
The third essay is a theoretical exercise. Considering consumer attitudes towards GM 
products, the enforcement of the IPRs by the private seed companies and the presence of 
negative externalities of the biotech seeds, I investigate the impact of these three factors 
on the production of biotech using general equilibrium and comparative statics analyses.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CROP YIELDS AND ONGOING PEST DENSITY: 
EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF BIOTECH CROPS IN INDIA 
 
Abstract: Several studies have evaluated the performance of biotechnology crops and 
found that the technology is successful in increasing yield and reducing the pesticides. In 
contrast, most studies fail to consider the dynamic aspect of the pest population, even 
though the pests are getting more resistant to both pesticide-producing crops and the 
pesticides. The pest density kept growing and different types of new pests kept emerging 
regardless of the amount of pesticides sprayed. The objective of this paper is to evaluate 
the performance of biotechnology crops in India, taking into account the pest density. I 
use the stochastic production function to capture the impacts of the inputs on the mean of 
the output and the effect of pest density on the variability of the output. Insecticides 
squared and human-labor squared are used as proxies for the pest density in order to get 
more accurate econometric estimation. Furthermore, comparative analysis is conducted 
between biotech and non-biotech crops using the elasticities of the insecticides and 
human labor with respect to the yield. The results show that the presence of new pests 
upon the adoption of the biotech seeds has nullified the productivity of the damage 
control inputs such as biotech seeds and the insecticides. 
Keywords: Biotechnology crops, pest density, stochastic production function, India 
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2.1. Introduction and Background 
 
 Biotechnology (BT) crops have been developed to substitute for conventional 
crops across the globe.  They have been commercialized for more than a decade. BT 
crops were designed by companies like Monsanto, Syngenta, and others to produce 
natural insecticides that fight against pests.  Farmers in some developing countries have 
embraced the technology, and it seemed to be successful in terms of a reduction in 
pesticide use and increasing yields.  Eighteen developing countries like South Africa, 
Burkina-Faso, China, and India adopted the technology over the period of 1996-2010 
(James, 2010). In particular, India has been cultivating BT crops, mostly cotton and 
maize, since 2002. Previous studies that evaluated the performance of the technology 
have undertaken farmer-level analysis using survey data, and their results are quite 
similar. More detailed results of some studies that have been done are provided in Table 
2.1. below. 
 However, these studies did not take into consideration the dynamic evolution of 
pest density. For example, there are some sucking pests like aphids and jassids over 
which BT crops have no control, and farmers still need to increase the use of insecticides. 
These secondary pests, which increase in numbers as other more traditional pests targeted 
by the GM crops, can result in causing significant damage to BT crops. In Australia, 
pesticide use against bollworms has dropped, but farmers still spray their BT cotton fields 
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with insecticides 4.6 times per year (Qayam et al, 2002).  Furthermore, in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh in India, farmers growing BT crops increase the numbers of sprays 
against the secondary pest aphids more than farmers growing conventional crops. (Report 
on production practices, 2002).  Even in the US, where the BT crops have been widely 
used, insecticide applications against bollworms have declined by half due to the 
introduction of BT crops; however, total insecticide use has remained stable due to the 
increasing importance of the secondary pests (Benbrook, 2003).   
 The strategies of the Integrated Pest Management, which include the use of BT 
crops, were developed with little attention to the dynamics of pests or the role of 
predators, parasites, and others biological control organisms. As a matter of fact, the 
combination of insecticide resistance and resurgence of cotton bollworm, cotton aphid, 
and other pests had become a major threat to cotton production in China (Wu and Guo, 
2005). In order to get a more comprehensive idea of the issue of pest proliferation due to 
the adoption of the BT crops, we would like to make use of the history.  For instance, 
before the 1970s, aphids could easily be controlled by treating seeds with insecticides. In 
the mid-1970s, aphids became a prominent pest of cotton owing to an insecticide-induced 
resurgence in mid-and late season (Wuhan, 1980 and Guo, 2003). The increasing aphid 
damage to cotton was caused by the insecticide sprays against H.armigera, which kill 
most natural enemies of the aphid, such as ladybeetles and lacewings. Therefore, the 
reduction in predation mingled with a high resistance to insecticides has resulted in major 
yield losses (Xing et al., 1991). Furthermore, we need to emphasize the roles of target 
pests, and nontarget pests in the proliferation of the secondary pests.  In the cotton field 
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for example, the target pests are cotton bollworm and pink bollworm, and the nontarget 
pests are mirids and aphids. Cotton field experiments in China show that mirid density is 
significantly higher on nonsprayed BT cotton than on sprayed non-BT cotton owing to a 
reduction in the number of insecticide applications against H. armigera. (Wu and Guo, 
2005).  In addition, the substitution of broad spectrum chemical pesticides, with a narrow 
spectrum toxin such as BT, would result in a higher concentration of secondary pests 
(Wang et al., 2008) 
  This suggests that the mirids have become key insect pests in BT cotton fields, 
and their damage to cotton could increase further with the expansion of BT cotton-
growing areas if no additional measures are adopted. Consequently, BT crops are not the 
ultimate pest management strategy given the dynamic proliferation of the secondary 
pests. Considering the resistance management of target insects, the greatest threat to the 
continued efficacy of BT cotton against H.armigera is evolution of resistance (Burd et 
al., 2003 and Wu et al., 2002). 
 In sum, the reduction in chemical pesticide use associated with BT crops 
production is increasing the abundance of some insects and improving the natural control 
of specific pests such as cotton aphids. In contrast, chemical control, especially the use of 
more specific, less disruptive compounds, remains important for controlling 
nonlepidotrean pests such as mirids and spider mites (Wu and Guo, 2005).  
 From the economic perspective, some studies show there is no economic benefit 
for farmers planting BT crops compared with those who planted conventional crop seeds. 
Wang et al. (2008) in their survey, suggest that the main reason for the eroding advantage 
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of BT cotton was the increasing prevalence of the secondary pests for which BT was 
never designed to control and the higher cost of BT-cotton seeds. For example, from 
1999 to 2004, the quantity of pesticide used to control secondary pests increased several 
fold in the four provinces which were subject to the studies conducted in China. 
Similarly, the pesticide used to control secondary pests in 2004 dominates that for 2001 
at all levels of use, thus suggesting that pesticide expenditures due to secondary pests has 
increased the cost of production (Wang et al., 2008). 
 The goal of this paper is to consider the presence of the secondary pests in order 
to provide more accurate evaluation. Using a Just-Pope production function, we consider 
risky elements that affect yield variability. In general, farmers cannot accurately predict 
either the population growth of the pests that could attack their crops in the next 
generations or the rainfall that could favor the presence of pests. In many agricultural 
situations, both pest density and rainfall are very important variables (Shankar et al., 
2008).    
2.2.Theoretical Approach 
 
 Following Qaim et al (2005) and Shankar et al (2008), we use a Just-Pope 
production function in which Y accounts for yield, X is an input vector, and Z represents 
pest density. The production function is: 
           =                 +              (1)  
 (        )      ∑         ∑        
       (2) 
                     )]
 1/2
,            ∏     
  
                 ∑             }   (3) 
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Inserting equations (2) and (3) into (1), the model becomes:  
                  ∑         ∑        
                 ∑             }   (4) 
The subscripts i, j and t stand for state, crops, and the time period, respectively. The 
coefficients   and α are related to the inputs and the pest density, respectively. The 
effects of the inputs on the mean of the output are given by  (          )              and 
the effects of the pest density on the output variance are portrayed by    (           )  
                         ∑                , under the assumption that        is 
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. Therefore, the error term       is 
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 
                        ∑                    
Q (       ) follows quadratic spline specification, and           follows Cobb-Douglas 
specification, assuming the constant returns to scale. Equation (4) is estimated using the 
Maximum Likelihood method. Saha et al., (1997) use Monte Carlo experiments to show 
that the Maximum Likelihood method for a stochastic production functions provides 
unbiased and more efficient estimates than FGLS. 
2.3. Data Description 
 
 This study is conducted using the data from India Agricultural Department 
between 1996 and 2009. The data covers   19 states in India and 7 crops which are cotton, 
maize, wheat, paddy, urad, gram, and rapeseed &mustard. We encountered some 
difficulties because some states do not produce all the 7 crops, and some crops were not 
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produced during the entire period selected. For example, the state of Assam did not 
produce cotton, gram, maize, or wheat, only produced urad between 2008 and 2009, and 
produced paddy and rapeseed and mustard (R&M) between 1996 and 2009. Similarly, the 
state of Andhra Pradesh produces gram (from 2005-2006), cotton, maize, paddy, and urad 
for the entire period; but did not produce wheat and R&M. Another difficulty is that only 
the costs of insecticides are available, but for the production function we need the 
physical quantity of insecticide inputs.  We thus use the cost share of insecticides relative 
to the total costs of cultivation instead. For lack of data on capital, interest paid on 
working capital is used as proxy for inputs of capital.  In the context of this paper, we use 
the yield (Qtl/hect) as output of 7 crops such as cotton, maize, paddy, gram, urad, gram, 
R&M, and wheat. Cotton, wheat, and maize are considered the major biotech crops in 
India (James, 2010).The inputs are seed (Kg.), fertilizer (Kg. Nutrients), manure (Qtl.), 
human labor (Man Hrs.), animal labor (Pair Hrs.), insecticides and  capital. The pest 
density is captured by counting the number of the species of insects, weeds, and fungi 
that attacked the crops considered in this study. Figure 2.1 provides an idea of the 
different types of pests. It shows that BT crops (cotton, wheat and maize) endure a strong 
pressure from insects, while non- BT crops are usually attacked by fungi and weeds.  
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Figure 2.1: Different types of pests per crops 
 
Source: Indian Agricultural Department 
  
 Table 2.2 describes the data used for biotech crops (cotton, wheat and maize) and 
table 2.3 provides the description of the data used for non-biotech crops (paddy, gram, 
urad and rape& mustard). After deletion of the missing observations and the removal of 
the outliers, the number of observations came down to 111, 101, and 59 for cotton, wheat 
and maize, respectively. Among the biotech crops, cotton is extensively cultivated in 
India and as it is described in table 2.2, it is human labor, insecticides and capital 
intensive crop. In other words, the cultivation of cotton cost more for farmers than that of 
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wheat and maize. For example, on average the cultivation of cotton requires 763.69 
manual hours of 
human labor, 79% of the total the cost goes into the purchase of insecticides and 325.90 
R.S. interests are paid on the working capital. Similarly, the cultivation of wheat on 
average requires 428.71 manual hours of human labor, 40% of the total cost spent on 
insecticides, and 245.53 R.S. interests paid on the working capital. In the same way, 
maize necessitates 579.80 manual hours, 20% on the total costs for insecticides and 
227.94 R.S. interests paid on the working capital, on average. Table 2.3 describes the data 
used for the non-biotech crops (paddy, urad, and gram and rape &mustard). The number 
of observations are 171, 66, 74 and 86 for paddy, urad, gram and rape&mustard, 
respectively. 
 On average, human labor is heavily used in the cultivation of paddy than on any 
other non-biotech crops. For example, 823.19 manual hours is dedicated to paddy 
compared to 327.85 manual hours devoted to the cultivation of gram. 70 % of the total 
cost is used on insecticides and 326.46 R.S. interests are paid on the working capital for 
the cultivation of paddy. As for urad, gram and rape&mustard, the cost share of 
insecticides are 0.9%, 11% and 0.61% respectively. The amount of manual hours used in 
the cultivation of urad and gram are relatively the same and that of rape&mustard is 
438.17 manual hours on average. 
 In sum, the cultivation of cotton is more expensive in India than that of other 
biotech crops and the cultivation of paddy is also more expensive than that of other non-
biotech crops. 
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2.4.Estimation Methods 
  
 Equation (4) is estimated with the Maximum Likelihood under heteroscedasticity 
following the three -step process described by Just and Pope (1979). Specifically, 
Harvey’s multiplicative heteroscedasticity is considered to estimate the model 
parameters. We have defined i =1… n inputs, j = regions and the time periods. In the 
procedure, we define     
  = [1,    
 ], where we consider      
   the suspected variables 
causing heteroscedascity. In the context of this paper, the pest density is specified as the 
main factor causing heteroscedasticity because it may affect the variability of the yield 
under the adoption of the agricultural biotechnology.  Some other factors such as rainfall, 
agroecological factors and farmers’ education level could affect the variability of the 
yield, but they are not considered in this paper due to lack of data.   Furthermore, we 
believe that the emergence of the new pests is followed by additional applications of 
pesticides or insecticides which require additional human labor. In other words, 
additional human labor is devoted to spraying activities to combat new pests. As a result, 
the quadratic forms of insecticides and that of human labor are considered as proxies of 
pest density which is not easy to measure. Despite the fact that different types of pest that 
attacked each crop are known, this information is not sufficient for an econometric 
estimation. Therefore, in our model       
  is defined as follow: 
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2.5.Estimation Results 
 
 The estimation of the equation (4) was conducted for each of the 7 crops 
separately because the contribution of the inputs to the yield and the agroecological 
conditions for the crops are not identical across India. The estimation results of each crop 
are presented from table 2.4 through table 2.10 presented below. Since the goal of this 
study is to evaluate the performance of biotech crops taking into account the presence of 
new pests, we are only interested in the estimates of insecticides, insecticides squared, 
human labor and human labor squared. In the mean equation, their coefficients are 
interpreted as the expected value of yield with respect to the variable inputs. For example, 
the estimates with positive coefficients lead to an increase in the excepted value of yield 
and the estimates with negative values trigger a decrease in the expected value of yield. 
As for cotton, the expected value of the yield increases by 5.0425 kg with an additional 
1% of the total cost spent on insecticides. The negative coefficient of the insecticides 
squared could be explained by the emergence of new pest that has nullified the yield 
increasing characteristics of the insecticides. In other words, cotton yield experiences 
diminishing returns at the presence of the new pest despite the damage control 
characteristics of the insecticides. Similarly, the negative coefficient of human labor 
squared also shows diminishing returns effect of the additional manual hours spent on 
spraying insecticides. In the mean equation, unlike the coefficient of human labor, the 
coefficient of insecticides is highly significant. Turning to the variability of the yield, 
human labor squared and insecticides squared which are considered as proxies of the pest 
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density exhibit negative and significant impact on the variance of the yield. That is, 
additional applications of the insecticides and extra manual hours of work due to the 
presence of the new pests reduce the risk on yield. The yield risk reducing effect could be 
coupled with the fact that biotech cotton seeds generate natural insecticides. Wheat which 
is also biotech crop experiences similar impact of insecticides, insectides squared, human 
labor and human labor squared on the yield in both the mean and the variance equations.  
 Unlike, cotton and wheat, maize has a different pattern in terms of yield effect of 
the inputs.  For example in the mean equation, the insecticides have negative impact on 
the yield but not significant. Human labor has positive and significant impact on the 
yield. In the variance equation both exhibit risk reducing impact on the yield and this is 
due again on the fact that maize is a biotech crop. Furthermore, the R
2
 from the 
estimation of the equation (4) for cotton, wheat and maize are 0.6339, 0.8393 and 0.8466, 
respectively. 
Considering the estimation results from the mean equation for non-biotech crops (paddy, 
gram and urad), insecticides and insecticides squared have positive impact on the yield as 
opposed to biotech crops. The explanation for this is that these crops are not targeted by 
the secondary pests and once the primary pests are killed by the insecticides, additional 
applications of the insecticides can only contribute to an increase of the yield. 
 However, these additional applications of the insecticides can also be harmful to 
the crops at the certain points and they may even impede productivity (Lichtenberg et al., 
1986). As a result, the coefficients of the insecticides squared and human labor squared in 
the variance equation are positive for paddy and it means that additional use of the inputs 
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can be risky for the yield.  As for the human labor, it exhibits diminishing returns to scale 
in the mean equation for paddy. The applications of the insecticides on urad increase 
yield by 5.00018 kg and the coefficient on the insecticides squared in the mean equation 
is positive. Similarly, the coefficients of human labor and human labor squared are 
positive in the mean equation. In the variance equation, insecticides squared have risk 
reducing effect but not significant and human labor squared has risk increasing effect. 
The results on urad are not surprising because it is not targeted by any major pests. In 
case of rape &mustard, both insecticides and human labor experience diminishing return 
effect on yield in the mean equation and risk increasing effect from the variance equation. 
2.6. Comparative Analysis between Biotech and Non-Biotech Crops using the 
Output Elasticities  
 
 Even though the yield of all the crops is measured in kilogram, it would be 
misleading by comparing the productivity of insecticides in the cotton field to the 
productivity of insecticides in the field of wheat despite the fact that both are biotech 
variety. The comparison of the productivity of the inputs will be more misleading when it 
occurs between biotech and non-biotech crops. In order to overcome this discrepancy, 
output elasticities of insectides and human labor are used. For biotech crops, we choose 
cotton and wheat since they are the major biotech crops in India and also are more 
targeted by the new pests.  As for non-biotech crops, we chose Urad which is not targeted 
at all, and paddy which is relatively targeted by the new pests. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show 
the relationship between output elasticities of insecticides and insecticides, and output 
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elasticities of human labor and human labor for cotton. Output elasticities of the 
insecticides are positive which means that 1% increase in insecticides increase the yield 
when the cost share of the insecticides is between 0 and 1.7. Output elasticities of 
insecticides become negative when the cost share of the insecticides is greater than 1.7. 
Similarly, output elasticity of human labor is zero at 199 manual hours of work and 
become negative from 200 manual hours of work. In other words, as the applications of 
the insecticides and the number of manual hours increase, the elasticities of these inputs 
increase as well but under the pressure of the pest density, they decrease and become 
negative. Similar trend is found for wheat which is also a major target for the sucking 
pests ( see Figures 2.4 and 2.5).   
 For paddy which is a non-biotech variety widely cultivated in India, output 
elasticities of the insecticides increase and are positive as the applications of the 
insecticides increase but at a decreasing rate (Figure2.6). Output elasticities of human 
labor increase and are positive when human labor increase up to 1000 manual hours of 
work and become negative after 1000 manual hours of work (Figure 2.7). For urad which 
is not targeted by any pests, the output elasticities of the insecticides increase sharply as 
the applications of the insecticides increase (Figure 2.8). Also, the elasticities of human 
labor increase at an exponential rate as the human labor increases (Figure 2.9). 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
2.7.Conclusion 
 
 The results from the stochastic production function show that both biotech 
varieties and insecticides contribute to the increasing yield, while the insecticides 
experience diminishing returns on yield due to pest density. From the comparative 
analysis, we found that the yields of the non-biotech crops are almost exempt from the 
threat of the emerging pests and the use of insecticides was successful in increasing yield. 
The key point is that the biotech seed increase and reduce the use of pesticides but under 
the threat of the new pests, these features of the biotech seeds are offset. 
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Table 2.1: The Results of Some Studies on BT Crops 
Countries  Year and rate 
of adoption 
Author   Findings 
Argentina  1995(0.7%) 
1998 (3.6%) 
2000 (5.4 %) 
2001-02 (5%) 
De Janvry and Qaim 
(2002) 
IV estimates and 
Quadratic 
specification of the 
yield function 
 Bt  technology reduces applications 
rates of toxic chemicals by 50 %, and 
increase the yield significantly 
India March 2002 
2005 (25%) 
Qaim et al.,(2006) 
Profit function 
Insecticides amount on Bt plots were 
reduced by 50% 
Lower insecticide expenditures 
Higher Yield and Profit ( $45 
revenue per acre for Bt cotton) 
 
Australia  1996-
1997(8% )  
2001-
2002(30%) 
James Clives, 2001 The average number of sprays 
required by Bt cotton is 40 % less 
than  that required y non-BT 
  Kristen et al., 2002 
 
Both large-scale and small-scale 
farmers enjoy financial benefits due 
to higher yields and despite higher 
seed costs 
USA 1996 (14%) 
2001 (34%)  
Edge et al.,2001 The findings after 5 yr. 
of commercial use on >2 × 10
6
 ha 
globally indicate 
that Bt cotton provides an effective 
method for 
lepidopteron control that is safer to 
humans and the 
environment than conventional 
broad-spectrum 
insecticides, making Bt cotton a 
valuable new tool in 
integrated pest management. 
Burkina- Faso 2005 Vitale et al., 2008 The first three years of Bt cotton file 
trials shows that Bt cotton increased 
yields by an average of 20% and 
reduced insecticide applications by 
two-third 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics- Biotech Crops in India 
VARIABLES N MEAN STD. DEV MIN MAX 
COTTON      
 Yield 111 12.55 8.00 2.53 46.47 
 Seed 111 17.18 31.53 0.00 156.49 
 Fertilizer 111 113.04 53.98 2.69 308.46 
 Manure 111 13.08 12.78 0.00 61.34 
 Human labor 111 763.69 273.74 184.87 1617.30 
 Animal labor 111 52.693 40.75 0 .13 150.80 
 Capital 111 325.90 142.35 24.28 728.83 
 Insecticides 111 0.79 0.63 0.02 3.80 
WHEAT              
 Yield 101 27.87 10.67 5.05 48.34 
 Seed 101 117.63 37.23 3.53 157.99 
 Fertilizer 101 128.90 56.18 18.73 236.79 
 Manure 101 9.76 16.38 0.00 83.58 
 Human labor 101 428.71 137.14 163.56 802.06 
 Animal labor 101 36.16 35.68 0.41 179.20 
 Capital 101 245.53 82.41 71.04 405.94 
 Insecticides 101 0.40 0.64 0.04 2.37 
 MAIZE             
 Yield 59 22.12 10.68 6.41 45.66 
 Seed 59 26.38 18.63 1.56 117.32 
 Fertilizer 59 105.84 57.19 24.39 258.54 
 Manure 59 18.80 15.56 0.00 50.49 
 Human labor 59 579.80 163.39 286.23 1267.40 
 Animal labor 59 63.32 27.34 4.35 111.57 
 Capital 59 227.94 148.26 49.40 694.83 
 Insecticides 59 0.20 0.35 0.00
2 
2.33 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics Non- Biotech Crops in India 
VARIABLES N MEAN ST. DEV MIN MAX 
PADDY      
Yield 171 34.09 12.58 2.19 70.53 
 Seed 171 45.01 39.83 0.00 115.92 
 Fertilizer 171 124.20 68.34 0.68 265.35 
 Manure 171 19.58 15.61 0.00 80.42 
 Human labor 171 823.19 253.12 121.71 1327.30 
 Animal labor 171 79.23 72.753 0.40 259.37 
 Capital 171 326.46 151.04 76.68 726.40 
 Insecticides 171 0.70 0.84 0.001 3.62 
 URAD              
 Yield 66 4.93 2.08 2.16 12.94 
 Seed 66 22.61 7.03 6.75 39.98 
 Fertilizer 66 16.55 19.33 0.00 82.84 
 Manure 66 2.15 3.16 0.00 19.80 
 Human labor 66 346.94 88.86 94.20 578.73 
 Animal labor 66 43.09 34.64 1.51 109.95 
 Capital 66 152.97 144.01 49.14 716.84 
 Insecticides 66 0.09 0.16 0.0006 0.91 
 GRAM             
 Yield 74 9.52 2.91 5.05 19.90 
 Seed 74 67.65 24.00 1.24 101.19 
 Fertilizer 74 34.83 31.67 1.70 157.48 
 Manure 74 1.89 8.95 0.00 73.83 
 Human labor 74 327.85 128.65 185.18 801.91 
 Animal labor 74 36.08 19.86 2.49 83.61 
 Capital 74 177.10 94.13 59.65 555.61 
 Insecticides 74 0.11 0.18 0.0002 0.95 
RAPE&MUSTARD      
 Yield 86 14.10 11.25 4.33 68.01 
 Seed 86 7.71 11.02 0.00 85.17 
 Fertilizer 86 91.64 42.69 8.17 212.89 
 Manure 86 6.90 9.18 0.00 45.31 
 Human labor 86 438.17 151.48 229.47 999.87 
 Animal labor 86 55.48 71.71 0.36 244.29 
 Capital 86 203.09 110.10 57.95 593.56 
 Insecticides 86 0.061 0.07 0.0003 0.36 
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results: Cotton   
COTTON   
Variable    Estimated Coef. Std. Error T-Ratio 
Mean Equation:      
Seed -0.29066 0.9359e-01 -3.106 
Fertilizer 0.29021e-01 0.2746e-01 1.057 
Manure 0.10500 0.6923e-01 1.517 
Human labor 0.38707e-02 0.9771e-02 0.3961 
Animal labor -0.69757e-01 0.2905e-01 -2.402 
Capital -0.23211e-01 0.1365e-01 -1.701 
Insecticides 5.0425 1.265 3.985 
Seed Squared 0.27044e-02 0.6244e-03 4.331 
Fertilizer Squared -0.54806e-04 0.7701e-04 -0.7117 
Manure Squared -0.23080e-02 0.1212e-02 -1.904 
Human labor    Squared -0.20611e-05 0.4265e-05 -0.4833 
Animal labor Squared 0.14101e-03 0.2202e-03 0.6405 
Capital Squared 0.53386e-04 0.1663e-04 3.209 
Insecticides Squared -1.5010 0.3899 -3.850 
Constant 10.350 4.692 2.206 
Variance Equation:    
Human labor    Squared -1.1558 0.1757 -6.580 
Insecticides Squared -0.21893 0.8068e-01 -2.713 
Constant 17.395 2.311 7.529 
R-Square 0.6339 
Log-likelihood Function -292.655 
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Table 2.5: Estimation Results: Wheat 
WHEAT 
Variable    Coef.  Std. Error T-Ratio 
Mean Equation:      
Seed 0.17615      0.5345e-01 3.295      
Fertilizer 0.17703      0.4904e-01 3.610      
Manure 0.34118      0.7422e-01 4.597      
Human labor 0.66168e-01   0.2373e-01 2.789     
Animal labor -0.83836e-01   0.3801e-01 -2.206      
Capital -0.12816e-01 0.2271e-01 -0.5642      
Insecticides 9.2862         2.544 3.651     
Seed Squared 0.32071e-03 -0.3332e-03 -0.9624      
Fertilizer Squared -0.40069e-03 0.2001e-03 -2.002      
Manure Squared -0.35215e-02 0.8967e-03 -3.927      
Human labor    Squared -0.64594e-04 0.2102e-04 -3.072      
Animal labor Squared 0.20123e-03 0.1826e-03 1.102      
Capital Squared 0.27535e-04 0.4497e-04 0.6122      
Insecticides Squared -0.95707       1.264 -0.7570     
Constant -19.355       7.359 -2.630   
Variance Equation:    
Human labor    Squared -1.7494      0.2253 -7.763      
Insecticides Squared -0.10943         0.3301e-01 -3.315      
Constant 22.861       2.664 8.580      
R-Square                          0.8393 
Log-likelihood Function             -264.641 
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Table 2.6: Estimation Results: Maize 
MAIZE    
Variable       Coef. Std. Error T-Ratio 
Mean Equation:       
Seed 0.12230 0.1520 0.8047      
Fertilizer 0.18022 0.5478e-01 3.290      
Manure -0.13023 0.1796 -0.7252      
Human labor 0.68475e-01 0.2955e-01 2.317     
Animal labor -0.22665 0.9505e-01 -2.385     
Capital -0.97700e-02 0.2386e-01 -0.4096      
Insecticides -3.2416 5.693 -0.5694  
Seed Squared -0.59176e-03 0.1235e-02 -0.4792     
Fertilizer Squared -0.10903e-03 0.1954e-03 -0.5581      
Manure Squared 0.27271e-02 0.3591e-02 0.7594  
Human labor    Squared -0.54003e-04 0.2187e-04 -2.470     
Animal labor Squared 0.16169e-02 0.8736e-03 1.851      
Capital Squared 0.25934e-04 0.3017e-04 0.8596     
Insecticides Squared 2.0264 3.015 0.6721      
Constant -9.9866 10.69 -0.9341      
Variance Equation:    
Human labor    Squared 0.99676 0.3488 2.858      
Insecticides Squared -0.90357e-02 0.4574e-01 -0.1975      
Constant -9.9059 4.392 -2.255     
R-Square 0.8466 
Log-likelihood Function -165.196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Table 2.7: Estimation Results: Paddy  
PADDY    
Variable Coef. Std. Error T-Ratio 
Mean Equation:    
Seed -0.19637e-01 0.5200e-01 -0.3776     
Fertilizer 0.10464e-01 0.4657e-01 0.2247    
Manure 0.18718 0.8198e-01 2.283     
Human labor 0.63727e-01 0.1022e-01 6.238     
Animal labor -0.13911 0.3278e-01 -4.244  
Capital 0.58779e-01 0.1705e-01 3.447     
Insecticides 4.6177 2.222 2.078    
Seed Squared 0.34276e-03 0.5050e-03 0.6788     
Fertilizer Squared 0.26452e-03 0.1423e-03 1.859    
Manure Squared -0.91656e-03 0.1267e-02 -0.7234   
Human labor    Squared -0.31437e-04 0.5899e-05 -5.329    
Animal labor Squared 0.52031e-03 0.1068e-03 4.873    
Capital Squared -0.86614e-04 0.2167e-04 -3.998  
Insecticides Squared 0.41329 0.7484 0.5522   
Constant -11.942 4.716 -2.532   
Variance Equation:    
Human labor    Squared 0.10745 0.1478 0.7271     
Insecticides Squared 0.12774 0.2596e-01 4.920      
Constant 2.2259 1.968 1.131    
R-Square 0.8075 
Log-likelihood Function -
522.395 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 2.8: Estimation Results: Gram 
 
GRAM                            
Variable Coef. Std. Error T-Ratio 
Mean Equation:    
Seed -0.42595 0.4852e-01 -8.779      
Fertilizer -0.19779e-01 0.2334e-01 -0.8476  
Manure -0.83036 0.7821e-01 -10.62     
Human labor 0.16128e-01 0.8033e-02 2.008   
Animal labor 0.52853e-02 0.3806e-01 0.1389   
Capital 0.37025e-02 0.7475e-02 0.4953     
Insecticides 2.6911 3.400 0.7914   
Seed Squared 0.36428e-02 0.3828e-03 9.517  
Fertilizer Squared 0.11935e-03 0.1258e-03 0.9489   
Manure Squared 0.12306e-01 0.1093e-02 11.25      
Human labor    Squared -0.20307e-04 0.8066e-05 -2.518    
Animal labor Squared -0.71215e-04 0.4600e-03 -0.1548      
Capital Squared 0.11355e-04 0.1056e-04 1.076      
Insecticides Squared 1.9970 3.616 0.5523  
Constant 16.244 2.169 7.489      
Variance Equation:    
Human labor    Squared -1.3101 0.2639 -4.965      
Insecticides Squared -0.96204e-01 0.4068e-01 -2.365     
Constant 15.084 3.039 4.963      
R-Square 0.7108 
Log-likelihood Function -
132.280 
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Table 2.9: Estimation Results: Urad 
 
URAD                         
Variable Coef. Std. Error T-Ratio 
Mean Equation:       
Seed -0.32444 0.1638 -1.980     
Fertilizer -0.44943e-01 0.3149e-01 -1.427      
Manure -0.18465 0.1269 -1.455      
Human labor 0.26941e-02 0.7707e-02 0.3496 
Animal labor -0.40901e-01 0.2324e-01 -1.760    
Capital 0.10619e-01 0.5432e-02 1.955     
Insecticides 5.0018 2.379 2.103    
Seed Squared 0.83973e-02 0.3258e-02 2.577      
Fertilizer Squared 0.13992e-02 0.4695e-03 2.980    
Manure Squared 0.73911e-02 0.8049e-02 0.9183      
Human labor    Squared 0.16335e-05 0.1262e-04 0.1294     
Animal labor Squared 0.22352e-03 0.2076e-03 1.076   
Capital Squared -0.11661e-04 0.6979e-05 -1.671     
Insecticides Squared 0.89312 2.855 0.3128     
Constant 6.0029 2.125 2.825    
Variance Equation:    
Human labor    Squared 0.53898 0.3130 1.722     
Insecticides Squared -0.61026e-02 0.4290e-01 -0.1422      
Constant -6.1227 3.530 -1.734     
R-Square 0.7074 
Log-likelihood Function -99.8746 
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Table 2.10: Estimation Results: Rape& Mustard  
RAPE&MUSTARD  
Variable Coef. Std. Error T-Ratio 
Mean Equation:    
Seed -0.29410e-01 0.2612 -0.1126      
Fertilizer 0.10813 0.2128e-01 5.082      
Manure 0.33716 0.7755e-01 4.348      
Human labor 0.94445e-01 0.1127e-01 8.380      
Animal labor -0.65112e-01 0.1109e-01 -5.871     
Capital -0.79434e-01 0.9448e-02 -8.407    
Insecticides 39.034 12.21 3.196      
Seed Squared 0.19066e-02 0.3355e-02 0.5682      
Fertilizer Squared -0.18093e-03 0.1078e-03 -1.678      
Manure Squared -0.89593e-02 0.2134e-02 -4.199     
Human labor    Squared -0.11140e-03 0.1442e-04 -7.724      
Animal labor Squared 0.18247e-03 0.5412e-04 3.372      
Capital Squared 0.24118e-03 0.2781e-04 8.674      
Insecticides Squared -154.06 46.17 -3.336     
Constant -8.3632 2.517 -3.323      
Variance Equation:    
Human labor    Squared 1.6723 0.2155 7.762      
Insecticides Squared 0.49639e-04 0.4109e-05 12.08      
Constant -16.597 2.602 -6.379      
R-Square 0.6089 
Log-likelihood Function -
282.400 
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Figure 2. 2: Output Elasticities of Insecticides: Cotton            Figure 2.3: Output Elasticities of Human Labor: Cotton 
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Figure 2.4: Output Elasticities on Insecticides: Wheat Figure 2.5: Output Elasticities of Human Labor: Wheat 
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Figure 2.6: Output Elasticities of Insecticides: Paddy         Figure 2.7: Output Elasticities of  Human Labor: Paddy 
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Figure 2.8: Output Elasticities of Insecticides: Urad                      Figure 2.9: Output Elasticities of  Human Labor: Urad 
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CHAPTER 3 
EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PREFERENCES AND 
POLICY: TRADE CREATION OR TRADE DIVERSION? 
 
Abstract: One of the current issues in International Trade is the European restrictive 
trade policies on the agricultural biotechnology products from the rest of the World. The 
ban on these products by the European countries is likely to have had some impact on the 
trade flows between EU and its trading partners. I use the gravity model of international 
trade to assess the trade impacts of the EU trade policies towards the agricultural 
biotechnology products. The results show trade creation in Food and Live Animals. 
However, trade diversion was found in Beverages and Tobacco, Animal and Vegetable 
Oils and Fats. 
Keywords: Agricultural Biotechnology, Gravity Model, Trade Creation and Diversion, 
Panel Data 
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3.1.Introduction and background 
 
 The European Union’s restrictive policies towards biotechnology are closely 
dependent upon the attitudes of European consumers towards the biotech products. In 
Europe today, public opinion is more influential when it comes to the adoption of a 
technology. Negative attitudes were developed towards biotechnology since the 
occurrence of two major health crises: contaminated blood and mad cow disease 
outbreaks (Joly and Lemarie, 1998). Since these disease crises, European consumers have 
become very cautious about biotech foods and crops, and they have developed distrust 
towards their public regulation and expertise. Comparing the regulations of agri-food 
production of the US to those of the EU, the US focuses on regulating the end product 
and the EU has the tendency to regulate the whole production process. In general, US 
policies tend to be more supply-driven, while EU policies are dominated by consumer 
concerns (Hanitios, 2000). US consumers more often trust the Food and Drug 
Administration and United State Department of Agriculture scientists and more often  
accept the consumption of biotech crops and foods approved by these institutions. The 
difference between US and EU policies towards the agricultural biotechnology is that EU 
consumers influence the policy decisions and US consumers trust their officials and go 
for what is approved by food and safety officials. As a result, consumers’ preferences 
should not be neglected when it comes to EU policies towards biotech crops and food. As 
in the EU, public opinion actively constrains and influences the course of development of 
biotechnology (Durant, Bauer and Gaskell, 1998). For example, in the EU, bovine 
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somatotropin was not approved as a result of the resistance of a large amount of 
consumers who expressed animal health and welfare concerns (Gaskell, 2000).  
Growth and trade consequences of EU preferences and policies towards the 
agricultural biotechnology should not be overlooked. These growth and trade 
consequences could be addressed within EU countries, between the EU and biotech 
adopting countries, and between EU and non-biotech adopting countries. This paper 
discusses only trade effects between the EU and the rest of the World. The ban on both 
production and consumption of the agricultural biotechnology products has been an issue 
in European trade relationships with the rest of the World. The technology which is 
widely used by the North American countries is being transferred to the developing 
countries. Even though some developing countries are still reluctant to the technology 
due to the fear of loss of export to Europe, other are adopting it and are investing more in 
biotechnology research and development. Some authors argue that restrictive European 
Union policies on biotechnology production and consumption work in a manner similar 
to that of an export subsidy of capital to the South. That is, the South will become more 
capital intensive by producing more biotech products. North America will become the 
dominant producer of biotechnology research and development and biotech products, and 
the European Union will become dominant producer of traditional agricultural products. 
Francis et al. (2005) conclude that when factors are measured in efficiency units, the 
South will become more capital-intensive, EU will become relatively less capital 
intensive, leading to lower exports of capital intensive goods and smaller overall of trade. 
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The weakness of these arguments is the lack of empirical evidence. Both trade and 
growth effects of the restrictive EU biotechnology policies have not been empirically 
determined in the current literature. The motivation behind this paper is to show 
empirical evidence of trade effects. In that regard, we use the gravity model on 
international trade and the difference in difference estimation method to explain the trade 
effect of the EU policies towards the biotech products.  Our results suggest that the 
policies led to trade creation and trade diversion in some categories of the disaggregated 
imports data from the rest of the World to EU. 
3.2.Theory of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
 
The theory of trade creation and trade diversion was developed by Jacob Viner 
(1950) to describe the static and the dynamic impacts of the economic integration.  In the 
terms of Viner, trade creation arises when the economic integration leads to a shift in 
product origin from a domestic producer whose resource costs are higher to a member 
producer whose resource costs are lower. According to the standard neoclassical theory, 
trade creation always leads to welfare improvement as a result of the economic 
integration. Trade diversion happens when the economic integration leads to a shift in 
product of origin from nonmember producer whose resource costs are lower to a member 
country producer whose resource costs are higher. As a result, there is a welfare reducing 
consequence of the economic integration through trade diversion since the terms of trade 
of the importing country decrease by the amount of the tariff revenue forgone in shifting 
imports to a member country. Also, we should note that the elasticities of demand and 
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supply have some effects on the terms of trade  upon economic integration. Using partial 
equilibrium analysis to illustrate the concepts of trade creation (Figure 3.1) and trade 
diversion (Figure 3.2), we follow the textbook example (Appleyard et al, 6
th
 edition) 
where three countries A, B and C are trading partners. Country A is importing the good 
from country B as well as producing it domestically prior to the formation of the 
economic integration.  Before the economic integration which led to the removal of tariff 
among members, the price of the good in country A is $1.50 (the $ 1.00 price in country 
B plus the 50 percent tariff). With the integration between A and B, the tariff is removed, 
and A now imports 150 units (250units-100 units) rather than 40 units (200 units -
160units) from B. Sixty units ( 160-100) of the increased imports displace previous home 
production, and 50 units (250 units-200 units) reflects the greater consumption at the new 
$1.00 price facing  country A’s consumers. The net welfare impact is the sum of areas b 
and d. 
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Figure 3.1: Trade Creation and Welfare 
Price       SA 
 
 
 
 PA = PB (1+t) 
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$1.00 b d PB 
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Figure 3.2 : Trade Diversion and Welfare 
Price  SA 
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Figure 3.2 describes the case of trade diversion. Before the union with country B, country 
A has a 50 percent tariff on imports of the good. Thus country C’s tariff-inclusive price in 
A’s market is $1.50, and country B’s tariff inclusive price is $1.80 (not shown). Before 
the union, country A imports 50 units (180-130) from C. When the union is formed with 
B, country A imports 100 units (200-100), all coming from partner B, which no longer 
faces a tariff. The net welfare change for A is the difference between areas b+ d ( a 
positive effect due to lower price in A) and area e ( a negative effect due to lost tariff 
revenue by A that is not capture by A’s consumers).  The value of the tariff revenue is 
equal to the areas c and e.  The area c is the part of government revenue forgone after the 
integration, and it is transferred to domestic consumers through the reduction in the 
domestic price. The area e is the difference in cost between the nonmember source and 
the new higher-cost member source. The net effect of the economic integration between 
country A and country B depends on the sum (b+d-e).  This leads to ambiguity in the 
case of trade diversion. In this example, welfare is reduced since the areas b+d is greater 
than area e.  After describing the theory of trade creation and trade diversion, we will 
now test the theory in our special case. 
The Case of EU trade policy towards biotech products: Non- Tariff trade barriers 
 In the context of this paper we define three groups of countries that trade with 
each other.  The European Union is considered as a group importing from the rest of the 
world , BT- countries as a group of biotech adopting countries  exporting their products 
to  EU and the non-BT countries as a group of non-biotech countries exporting their 
products to EU. The restrictive trade policies of EU towards biotech countries could be 
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interpreted as an import quota equivalent to some specific tariff . We assume that the EU 
and non-BT countries are member of the same trading group and the BT-countries are 
nonmember countries of the regional trade area. We further assume that BT countries are 
the cost efficient partners where the products of origin are produced at a lower cost due to 
the technology, and the non-BT countries are the cost inefficient countries without the 
technology. Since EU prefers to import the non-biotech products at higher cost from the 
non BT trading partner, we expect the outcome to cause trade diversion in the Vinerian 
sense. In order to test our hypothesis of trade diversion of the EU trade policies, we 
estimate the gravity model to provide some empirical evidence. 
3.3. Theoretical Model 
3.3.1. The Gravity Model 
 
The gravity model introduced by Tinbergen (1962) has been widely used in the 
literature of the international trade to measure the impact of different factors on bilateral 
trade flows.  The model specifies trade between two countries as a function of their 
GDPs, GDPs per capita, and the geographical distance between them. Many researchers 
have extended the basic gravity equation by adding other variables to test for the 
influence of geographic, ethnic, linguistic, and economic conditions. The dependent 
variable varies across studies depending on the purpose of the researcher.  For example, 
some studies use the sum of import and export flows as dependent variables (Frankel, 
1997; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997) while others consider either import or export 
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flows.  When it comes to the analysis of trade creation or trade diversion, most studies 
choose import flows as the dependent variable (Soloaga & Winters, 2001; Fakao et al., 
2003; Clausing, 2001; Magee, 2008). In the context of this paper in which the issue of 
trade creation and trade diversion is the centerpiece, we choose the import flows to 
European Union from the Rest of the World as the dependent variable. The EU is treated 
as one country trading with the Rest of the World. The theoretical model is defined as 
follows: 
   (    )             (             )        [(
   
   
)  (
   
   
)  ]         (      )       
(1) 
The variables of the model are defined as follows: 
                                                                 
                                                         
Pop: population of all the countries considered and that of EU countries altogether. 
The definition of distance between countries has been a controversial issue in the 
literature of the gravity model of trade. Some authors used latitude and longitude data to 
measure the distance, while other use the trade costs as proxies of the distance. (Bosker 
and Garretsen, 2010). 
 In the context this paper, since EU countries are considered as one country, the 
difficulty of measuring the distance arises. The distance is proxied by the average of the 
ratio of imports C.I.F and exports F.O.B minus one [(cif/fop) -1] for the EU countries. 
Since the gravity model of international trade uses distance to proxy transport and other 
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costs associated with carrying out international transactions, the use of the ratio of C.I.F. 
to F.O.B. prices may actually come closer to the spirit of the model than the simple 
geographic distance between individual countries.  In order to analyze the effects of 
European restrictive trade policies against the biotech products on the imports of the EU 
from the Rest of the World, the equation 1 is extended by including  a set of dummy 
variables standing for  European Union trade policies against agricultural biotechnology 
products, agricultural biotechnology adopting countries, and EU consumer preferences. 
The policy variable is defined POL =1 in the year 2003 when the ban was more stringent 
(REGULATION (EC) No 1829/2003) and 0 otherwise.  The biotech countries exporting 
their products to EU are considered as treated group and the remaining countries are the 
control group. BT =1 for the biotech countries and 0 otherwise. The consumer 
preferences are proxied by the category of the commodity groups to which the biotech 
products belong. 
 
3.3.2. The Augmented Gravity model 
 
 The hypothetical question of this paper is to determine whether the EU trade 
policies against biotech products led to trade creation or trade diversion. In order to 
answer this question, the augmented gravity equation defined below has been estimated. 
Ten categories of commodities shown in Table 3.1 are considered in this study where the 
biotech products belong to three groups of commodities: Food and Live Animals, 
Beverages and Tobacco, Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats. Table 3.2 details the 
specific products that belong to the three groups of commodities.  
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The augmented gravity equation is defined as follows: 
   (      )             (               )        [(
   
   
)   (
   
   
)   ]         (      )
         
                                                           
       (2) 
 
The variable k stands for commodity and t for time period (year). 
 Positive and significant coefficients on the parameters representing policy, BT 
countries and consumer preferences are interpreted as trade in excess of what is predicted 
by the gravity model and are thus considered as evidence of trade creation caused by BT 
trade policies. Similarly, negative and significant coefficients on those variables are 
interpreted as less trade than the predicted and are the evidence of trade diversion 
(Jayasinghe and Sarker, 2007). 
 3.4. Data 
 The import data collected from the UN comtrade database are in nominal values 
($US millions) and are considered as the dependent variable. The import flows of ten 
categories of commodities are from 142 countries to the EU between the years 2000 and 
2011.  One of our goals in this study is to see the impact of EU restrictive trade policy 
towards biotech products on the import flows from the biotech Countries. Among the 
biotech Countries, US and China have extremely high imports flows to EU. For example, 
the coefficient on BT dummy when US and China are include in the data is 30.44216. 
That is, the import flows increase by 3044% from biotech Countries to EU. In contrast, 
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dropping US and China from the dataset, the coefficient on BT is 0.090 which means that 
there is 9% increase of import flows from biotech Countries to EU. The main reason US 
and China are dropped from the dataset is that the dummy variable BT is just capturing 
the imports of these countries to EU. The GDP and population data are collected from the 
World Bank. The distance is proxied by the average of the ratio of imports C.I.F and 
exports F.O.B minus one [(cif/fop) -1] for the EU countries.  There were some missing 
values from year 2009 to 2011 for some countries and these values were replaced with 
extrapolated values. All the gravity variables are presented in logarithm. The biotech 
products belong to three categories of the commodities: Food and Live Animals, 
Beverages and Tobacco, and Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats. These categories are 
shown in the disaggregated commodities data presented in Table 3.1 below. The other 
variables are represented by dummies. The data is organized as unbalanced panel set.   
 Import flows, the product of GDPs, the product of per capita GDPs, and distance 
are in logarithmic form, and they are summarized in Table 3.3 below.  The other 
variables are all dummies. With 142 countries, 10 categories of commodities, and 12 
years of observations, there should be 17,040 observations.  However, because of missing 
data, we instead estimate an unbalanced panel set with 15,654 observations. The 
variables import flows, product of GDPs, product of per capita GDP, and distance are all 
measured in millions of US dollars between 2000 and 2011. 
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3.5. Estimation and Results 
 
The augmented gravity model described in Equation (2) is estimated using the method of 
pooled OLS. The results presented in Table 3.4 show positive and significant coefficients 
for the product of GDPs and GDP per capita.  The coefficients for distance for the 
alternative regressions are significant and negative. These results are in line with the 
theory of the gravity model. Given the purpose of our study, we add BT countries fixed 
effects to capture time invariant shocks like other trade agreement between EU and BT 
countries as well as interaction BT Countries –year fixed effects to control for any other 
things that might affect imports to the EU. Equation 2 was separately estimated first 
without any specific fixed effects, then controlling for BT countries, and finally 
controlling for BT countries-year. The results for the three regressions are reported side-
by-side in Table 3.4 below. From the results of the first estimation, the coefficient on BT 
variable is positive and significant but since the fixed effects terms are excluded, any 
other trade flows between BT countries and EU were not being controlled. In the second 
regression, BT variable was dropped since BT countries fixed effects are included in the 
regressions because the presence of the two variables has caused a dummy trap. In the 
third regression, since both BT countries fixed effects and BT countries –year fixed 
effects are included; every other things that might affect trade between EU and BT 
countries are being controlled. As a result, the estimation results from the third 
regressions are relatively unbiased compared to the first two. 
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 The interpretation of the parameter estimates (γs and αs) follows the approach of 
Halvorsen and Palmquist,
 
who calculated the percentage effect of the dummy variables. 
For example, assuming that the coefficient estimate of the BT dummy variable in 
equation (2) is γ1, the result shows that BT countries traded an extra {exp (γ1)-1} x 100% 
with EU relative to the amount non-BT country traded with EU. Similarly, if the 
estimated coefficient, γ2 is negative, it shows that BT countries traded {exp (-γ2) -1} 
x100% less with EU relative to the amount traded with non-BT country traded with EU. 
The equivalent dollar value of each estimated coefficients are calculated and presented in 
Table 3.5 by multiplying the percentage changes by imports mean.  
 The interpretation of the estimated coefficients on commodities has served to 
provide an idea of the impact of EU preferences of the agricultural biotechnology. 
Likewise, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients on policy variable was used to 
provide the impact of the EU restrictive policy on import flows from the rest of the 
World. The estimation results show trade creation in the category of Food and Live 
Animals. In other words, there is on average 77.89% increase in imports flows for Food 
and Live Animals from the rest of World to EU. Furthermore, the estimate of the policy 
variable is negative, but it cannot be considered as evidence of trade diversion since it is 
not statistically significant. Trade diversion was found in the categories of Beverages and 
Tobacco, and Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats, where the imports flows decrease on 
average by 72.17%  in the former category and by 74.00% in the latter category. Without 
considering BT countries and BT countries-year fixed effects, trade creation was found 
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for BT countries. This could be explained by the fact that EU has other different form of 
trade relationship with the BT countries, which has nothing to do with the fact that these 
countries adopted the agricultural biotechnology. The estimated coefficient for the 
interaction term (BT*Policy), which is negative in the first estimation result suggests that 
EU trade policies on biotech products from the treated groups (BT countries) has caused 
a decrease in the import flows. The estimated coefficients from the second and third 
regressions suggest that the EU policy on biotech increases imports between EU and BT 
countries by 1.79% and 15.49% respectively. However, since these coefficients are not 
statistically significant, this does not constitute evidence of trade creation.  In addition, 
the coefficient of the policy variable is negative in all the three estimation results. Based 
on the estimated results from the third regression, the import flows have decreased by 
2.96% due to BT policy, but this estimate of the coefficient of the policy variable is not 
significant.  
 In order the link the estimation results to the theory of trade creation and trade 
diversion, we follow Jayasinghe and Sarker, 2007 to compute the dollar value 
corresponding to each estimated coefficient by multiplying the mean value of total 
imports flows for each category of commodities by its percentage change. The estimated 
coefficients were taken from the third estimation results in Table 3.4 because the 
estimation results from the third regressions are relatively unbiased compared to the first 
two. According to the results in Table 3.5 below, the EU could have imported 782.294 
millions of dollars of beverages and tobacco from the rest of the World at lower costs if 
EU consumers had not pushed their governments to reject biotech products. Similarly, the 
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EU could have imported 831.018 millions of dollars Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats 
from the rest of the World at lower costs. An additional 2836.946 millions of dollars of 
Food and Live Animals has been imported from the rest of the world despite consumers’ 
negative attitudes towards biotech products. 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
The results show that the impact of EU consumer preferences proxied by three categories 
of commodities had a significant impact on imports between EU and the rest of the 
World. Furthermore, these preferences led to trade diversion in the categories of 
Beverages and Tobacco and that of Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats. In contrast, 
trade creation was found in the category of Food and Live Animals. The coefficient of  
the policy variable is negative but not statistically significant. Therefore, this cannot be 
considered as evidence of either trade creation or trade diversion.  
 In sum, the augmented gravity model has enabled us to measure the impact of the 
EU’s restrictive trade policies on trade creation and trade diversion. However, since the 
coefficient estimates of the policy variable are not significant in this study, further 
analysis is called for.  Further influences on trade must be incorporated into the models, 
and alternative data must be used.  Also, in this study the product categories are rather 
broad.  The data should be further disaggregated in order to better distinguish the policy’s 
effects.   
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Table 3.1: Disaggregated Commodities Data 
Category Code Commodity Description 
S1-0  
S1-1  
S1-2  
S1-3  
S1-4  
S1-5  
S1-6  
S1-7  
S1-8  
S1-9  
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels  
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  
Animal and vegetable oils and fats  
Chemicals  
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material  
Machinery and transport equipment  
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
Commod. & transacts. Not classified. Accord. To kind 
Source: UN Comtrade  
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Table 3.2: Category of Commodities with Biotech Products 
Commodity 
Category 
E.U. Trade Restrictions  per products  Status 
Food and Live 
Animals 
 
 
-Tomatoes: Puree made from GM tomatoes 
is not approved by EU. 
-Sugar beet:  Cultivation of GM sugar beet in 
the EU is not expected before 2015. 
-Rapeseed: For the time being, no GM 
rapeseed is grown in Europe. 
-Food  produced  from MON1445 cotton 
(cp4 epsps gene inserted to confer tolerance 
to the herbicide glyphosate) 
-Food additives produced from MON1445 
cotton 
-Feed produced from GMO bacteria: 
“bacteria biomass” 
-Feed materials produced from GMO yeast : 
“ yeast biomass” 
-maize (Bt176) and its derived products 
 
Authorization 
expired 12/18/2011 
Renewal of 
authorization 
ongoing 
 
Renewal of 
authorization 
ongoing 
withdrawn 
Beverages and 
Tobacco 
Derived products  
 
Animal and 
Vegetable Oils 
and Fats 
-oilseed rape (GT73) 
-oilseed rape ( T45) 
-oil swede-rape (MS8, RF3, MS8xRF3) 
-hybrid oilseed rape ( MS1xRF1) 
-hybrid oilseed rape and Topas ( MS1xRF2)  
-Derived products 
Renewal of 
authorization 
ongoing 
withdrawn 
Sources: European Commission Website 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Log of Imports Flows 
Log of Product of GDPs 
Log of Product of per Capita 
GDP 
Log of Distance 
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Animal and Vegetable Oils and 
Fats 
BT countries 
Policy 
BT*Policy 
15654 
15654 
15654 
16454 
15654 
15654 
15654 
15654 
15654 
15654 
6.885 
16.638 
13.786 
-0.313 
0.107 
0.096 
0.075 
0.188 
0.083 
0.015 
1.737 
0.879 
0.662 
0.030 
0.310 
0.295 
0.264 
0.390 
0.276 
0.124 
0.954 
13.323 
0.00 
-0.370 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
16.913 
18.911 
15.425 
-0.269 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results 
 
Variables Coef. (1) S.E. T-stat Coef (2) S.E. T-stat Coef (3) S.E. T-stat 
Intercept 
Product of GDPs 
Product of per Capita GDP 
Distance 
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats 
BT countries 
Policy 
BT*Policy 
BT countries Fixed Effects 
BT countries-year Fixed Effects 
-27.86 
1.111 
1.166 
-1.129 
0.576 
-1.280 
-1.342 
0.083 
-0.014 
-0.067 
NO 
NO 
0.39 
0.013 
0.017 
0.155 
0.032 
0.034 
0.038 
0.031 
0.041 
0.093 
 
 
-71.40 
82.20 
68.07 
-7.27 
17.57 
-37.09 
-34.80 
2.66 
-0.34 
-0.73 
 
-28.47 
1.127 
1.191 
-1.174 
0.577 
-1.280 
-1.347 
----- 
-0.029 
0.0177 
YES 
NO 
0.391 
0.013 
0.017 
0.154 
0.032 
0.034 
0.038 
------ 
0.041 
0.091 
 
-72.81 
83.12 
67.93 
-7.60 
17.71 
-37.37 
-35.17 
------ 
-0.72 
0.19 
 
-27.62 
 1.103 
 1.156 
-1.297 
0.576 
-1.279 
-1.347 
-------- 
-0.030 
 0.144 
YES 
YES 
0.429 
0.014 
0.019 
0.172 
0.032 
0.034 
0.038 
------- 
0.042 
0.398 
-60.25 
76.07 
60.83 
-7.54 
17.61 
-37.16 
-34.98 
------- 
-0.72 
0.36 
 
 
 N =15664                         R
2 
= 0.47   0.48   0.47   
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Table 3.5: Trade Effect of EU Consumers Biotech Preferences  
Variables Estimated 
Coef. 
 Percentage 
Changes 
Imports 
Mean 
Equivalent 
US dollar 
Trade 
Effect 
Food & Live 
Animals 
0.576 
77.89% 
3642.208 
2836.946 Trade 
Creation 
Beverages and 
Tobacco 
-1.279 
-72.17% 1077.530 
 
-777.636 Trade 
Diversion 
Animal and 
vegetables Oils 
and Fats 
-1.347 
-74.00% 1123.027 
 
-831.018 Trade 
Diversion 
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CHAPTER 4 
SHOULD THE SOUTH AND EU ADOPT THE AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY? GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY 
 
Abstract: Ongoing debates about the adoption of the agricultural biotechnology in the 
developing countries and EU have dominated the literature in development economics 
and biosciences. The current literature emphasizes more current positive aspects of the 
technology without taking into account the effects of the enforcement of the Intellectual 
Property Rights, consumers’ preferences and the negative externalities which include 
environmental and social related issues. The goal of this paper is to account for such 
factors using a general equilibrium approach and comparative statics analysis to 
determine the impact of the enforcement of the IPRs, consumers’ preferences and 
externalities on the production of biotech crops. The results show that efficient 
production of biotech crops under the influence of the three factors mentioned above is 
contingent upon several parameters of the model. These parameters include output 
elasticity of capital in both biotech and non-biotech productions, total factor productivity 
in biotech production, and the ratio of the proportions of the biotech and non-biotech 
products consumed by each consumer. From the economic standpoint, any country that is 
envisioning in adopting the agricultural biotech should consider the impact of these 
parameters on the efficient production without ignoring the reality that surrounds the 
technology itself. 
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4.1. Introduction and Background 
 
 Private firms in North America came up with new technology to create seeds that 
are more resistant to insects, drought, weeds etc. This innovative step not only increases 
yields and reduces the amount of insecticides used, but it also has the property of damage 
control. Moreover, the technology provides environmental benefits to countries by 
increasing production while reducing the use of chemicals, pesticides, and herbicides 
(Haghiri and Philips, 2003). Some people and corporations suggest that the agricultural 
biotechnology is known in the current century as the only way to assure food security in 
the developing world where the population is growing faster than the food supplies. It 
means that the rate of increase in the world food supplies cannot match the rate of the 
population growth (Haghiri and Philips, 2003). This argument is very controversial in the 
sense that it may not even be true for some specific countries because the nutrition 
system for each country is very different as well as the agricultural policies. Despite some 
positive features of the agricultural biotechnology, farmers in the developing countries 
are still reluctant in adopting it, and consumers are very cautious about the biotech 
products due to health, cultural, ethical and moral concerns. The major reasons of the 
delay in the adoption of the agricultural biotech in some developing countries and EU are 
explained in the following lines.  
First, the technology is expensive for the impoverished farmers with little working 
capital because of the enforcement of the IPRs. In other words, in addition to seed costs, 
seed companies charge farmers a technology fee. As a result, the seeds become more 
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expensive for farmers who may end up bankrupt mostly in the presence of some 
uncertainty due to new emerging pests, random weather conditions and even some 
market distortions. Since the technology is owned by the private seed industry, often 
protected by the intellectual property rights, many varieties have become expensive and 
practically inaccessible to poverty-stricken farmers in Africa (Black et al., 2011). High 
seed costs due to the enforcement of IPRs have some indirect social impacts as well. 
Cotton cultivation in India has been plagued with rising costs of cultivation, ineffective 
pesticides, adulterated seeds and other factors leading to consecutive crop failures, and 
heavy indebtedness has led to suicides by farmers (Lalitha, 2007). For example, “For 
farmers such as Vithal Bhindarwa, however, investing in BT cottonseeds did not lead to 
economic security. Hoping to provide a better life for his wife and children, Bhindarwa 
purchased these higher-priced seeds through loans in excess of Rs. 28,000 [US$566 in 
2008] both from the State bank and from private moneylenders. When his crop failed in 
2008 as a result of unpredictable weather conditions, Bhindarwa was unable to pay back 
his loans and took his own life by swallowing rat poison, leaving his 22-year-old son, 
Gajanan, as the head of the family. Bhindarwa’s story is not uncommon: for too many 
farmers, investing in BT cottonseeds has not led to greater financial security, but has 
instead contributed to their financial distress. The reason, as explained below, is that BT 
cottonseeds demand even more of two resources that are already scarce for many 
farmers: money and water” (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice and 
International Human Rights Clinic, 2011). The financial distress is worst for the farmers 
with very small plots of land, who have to deal with a great deal of yield uncertainty and 
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at the same time incurring high seed costs. Moreover, one could argue that the 
enforcement of the IRPs is to promote innovation in agricultural but it turned out to be 
more rent –seeking behavior as private investment becomes heavily higher than public 
investment. For example, private investment in biotechnology research is far ahead of 
public investment in developed countries ($5 billion), although public investment in 
biotechnology ($125 million) with the purpose of benefiting the farmers and consumers is 
increasing in developing countries (Qaim, 2001). Strong enforcement of the IPRs enable 
these companies to not only recover their costs, but also to increase profits by capturing 
much of the surplus generated by the predicted productivity gains.  However, the 
introduction of new seeds can be harmful to farmers because developing new seeds is not 
enough and other aspects of the agriculture in the developing countries such as land 
policies, research policies, transfer of the technology, and the acceptance of GMOs 
techniques should be considered.   
The enforcement of the IPRs was supported by WTO through the establishment of 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) at Uruguay Round 
negotiations of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Developed countries 
managed to negotiate the TRIPS agreement in spite of strong opposition from developing 
countries (Braga, 1995). Gaisford et al. (2002) suggest that in the context of 
biotechnology, it is not in the self-interest of producers in developing countries to respect 
intellectual property rights. Gaisford et al. (2007) using game theory approach and under 
certain assumptions, found that the TRIPS will not provide sufficient incentive for 
developing countries to protect intellectual property rights in biotechnology. Given that 
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the enforcement of the IPRs in the context of biotechnology is more harmful to famers 
than any other stakeholders. Haghiri and Philips (2003) suggest a model for regional 
intellectual property rights for developing countries especially Iran where individual IPRs 
are not enforceable. They found that the concept of regional- intellectual property rights 
would be more beneficial for neighboring countries and there should be joint 
contributions to R& D in the biotechnology sector which could yield real benefits. In sum, 
the enforcement of the Intellectual Property Rights supported by WTO through TRIPS 
and implemented by the seed companies through the charge of the technology fees on 
biotech seeds had become a heavy financial burden for farmers in developing countries. 
As a consequence, poor farmers with small plots of land might be better off growing 
conventional crops than biotech crops at the presence of the enforcement of the IRPs by 
private seeds companies.  
The second reason of the delay of the adoption of Agricultural biotech is 
consumers’ preferences. Consumers preferences towards biotech product significantly 
depend on the information disseminated about the products. There are two main sources 
of information on the biotech products and these sources are contentious. The fact that 
these two or many more sources of information on the biotech products conflict with each 
other, consumers preferences have become more convoluted in the sense that consumers 
have to evaluate the accuracy of any information before they can make purchasing 
decision.  Also, we should note that strong economic interests are tied up in GMO seeds. 
In other words, the issue of trust comes into play in consumers purchasing decisions 
about the biotech products. For example, the agricultural biotech firms are claiming that 
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GMO crops will lower food costs worldwide and improve environmental quality 
(Huffman et al., 2004). Moreover, they have touted the use of biotechnology to create 
new products as major source of revolution in product innovation (Hoban 1997, 2001).  
However, two environmental NGOs Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have provided 
evidence that raises the possibility of risks to human health, environment, and 
biodiversity. Given that controversy around the products, consumers in every country are 
cautious. Some countries require labeling of GMOs products and others reject the 
products as a whole. Consumers’ preferences vary across countries, geographic areas 
within Europe, and cultures. US consumers are more inclined towards GMO products 
than EU consumers because the perception of risks associated with biotechnology and 
overall awareness of biotechnology are somewhat lower among US consumers. 
Acceptance of the technology in the US is slightly higher (Hanitios, 2000). In Europe, 
Southern countries tend to accept biotechnology, while Northern countries are more 
cautious. The remarkable exceptions are the Netherlands and Finland, which are both 
strongly in favor of biotechnology. In contrast, the Dutch are the most concerned about 
the potential risks involved (Zechendorf, 1998).  Economic concerns, moral, ethical 
concerns are equally raised to address the issue of the consumer preferences towards 
biotech products. Cost- benefit analysis has been performed to determine the economic 
impact of the use of GMOs on consumers. Suppose that the price of GMOs crop drop, 
then the consumer will choose to consume more of that good and, consumer welfare or 
utility will increase (Hoban, 1996c; Moschini et al., 1999). Similarly, if the technology 
leads the prices of GM crops to increase, consumer welfare or utility will decrease 
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(Giannakos and Fulton, 2000). Some consumers due to their religious beliefs consider the 
fact that the technology brings change in the processes of natural life of the seeds, are 
reluctant in accepting GM crops (Huffman et al., 2004). 
Finally, negative externalities generated by the technology are causing delay in 
the adoption of the technology in EU and the developing countries. Biotech seeds create 
some negative externalities through the proliferation of secondary pests. For example, 
Bollworm populations are the main target of the technology; however while using biotech 
seeds which produce toxins designed to kill bollworms, farmers still have to spray some 
pesticides. The use of biotech seeds reduces the amount of pesticides sprayed because of 
the toxins produced by the seeds. For example, for the years 2000 and 2001, BT cotton 
was associated with 55 percent reduction in pesticide for the average Chinese farm (Pray 
et al. 2002). As a result, by reducing the amount of pesticides, farmers may have 
unintentionally created a safe haven for other pests not affected by BT technology (Wang 
et al., 2006). This phenomenon is called a pest externality, which occurs when the 
chemicals or the technology used to target one pest inadvertently increase the 
concentration of and damage from secondary pest. Pest externalities will affect not only 
the output of biotech crops, but also farmers’ decision whether to adopt the technology or 
not. Unfortunately crop damage is still endemic despite the use of biotech seeds and 
pesticides. The biotech seeds that were claimed to be very successful in resisting pests 
have some limits, and this is one of the reasons farmers in the developing world are still 
hesitant in adopting the technology. The main objective of this paper is to determine the 
impact of the enforcement of the intellectual property rights, consumers’ preferences, and 
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pest externality on the change in the output of biotech crops. Whether farmers will adopt 
the technology or not has something to do with their knowledge about the impact of these 
three factors on the output.  Our model considers only a small part of the issues 
concerning the agricultural biotechnology. Our analysis is based on the adoption decision 
of farmers in the developing countries and EU taking into account these three factors 
mentioned above. Also we should note that, these factors are usually overlooked in the 
evaluation of the biotech seeds. Our model includes only farmers and consumers and did 
not consider the seeds companies, biotech products markets, and the research 
development sector. The theoretical model accounting for these factors is described 
below.  
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4.2.Theoretical Model 
 
4.2.1 General Equilibrium and Efficiency 
 
 Consider an economy with two individuals (BT consumers and Non-BT 
consumers), two firms (BT producers and Non-BT producers) and two goods (BT 
products and Non-BT products). In order for the South and EU to adopt the technology, 
the efficiency conditions need to be satisfied. As a result efficiency in exchange, 
efficiency in production and efficiency in the output market must all be solved for. 
4.2.1.1 Efficiency in exchange 
 
 Efficiency of exchange is satisfied when the MRS1= MRS2. In order to achieve 
that efficiency, consumer 2 maximizes its utility (U
2
) subject to that of Consumer 1 (U
1
). 
The consumers have both BT and non-BT products in their consumption bundle. In order 
to get clear idea of the degree of substitution between BT and non-BT products for each 
consumer, we consider CES utility function for consumer 1 and consumer 2 (Arrow et 
al., 1961).  The degree of substitution will be used to determine the level of preferences 
of BT and non-BT products for each consumer. For example, if consumer 1 prefers BT to 
non-BT and consumer 2 prefers non-BT to BT, the elasticities of substitution of 
consumer 1 will be greater than that of consumer 2. 
The utility functions of each consumer are defined as follow: 

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U
1
 and U
2
 are the utilities functions of the consumer 1 and consumer2, respectively. 
1
bt
X and 1
nbt
Y  are consumer 1’s consumptions of biotech and non-biotech, respectively. 
2
bt
X and 2
nbt
Y  are consumer 2’s consumptions of biotech and non-biotech, respectively. 
bt
X  and 
nbt
Y  are the outputs of biotech and non-biotech products in the economy. 
In this closed economy model, we assume that the total production of biotech is 
consumed among the two consumers as well as the total production of non-biotech. 
Therefore the constraint equations are expressed as follow: 
bt
X
bt
X
bt
X  21 ;
nbt
Y
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Y  21  
Setting up the maximization problem we have: 
Max )
2;2(2
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Y
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Subject to 
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21
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 Setting the Lagragian we have: 
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1
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2121111
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Solving the first order conditions (FOCs), we end up with: 
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   (2)  
The coefficients a1and a2 are the proportions of BT products consumed by consumer 1 
and consumer 2, respectively; b1 and b2    are the proportions of non-BT products 
consumed by consumer 1 and consumer 2, respectively. Plugging (2) into (1) we have: 
 
 
The efficiency in exchange (Pareto efficiency allocation) holds at MRS1=MRS2 which 
implies both consumers lie on the contract curve in the Edgeworth box. In other words, 
the Pareto efficient bundle is determined at the mutual tangency of consumer1’s and 
consumer2‘s indifference curves in the Edgeworth box along the contract curve. These 
are the bundles at which consumer1’s and consumer 2’s marginal rate of substitution are 
equal. 
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4.2.1.2. Efficiency in Production 
 
 The production function of the agricultural biotech products is defined by 
considering the fact that there is knowledge spillover from the North to the South. That 
is, the developing countries use the technology developed by the North American private 
companies (Monsanto, Syngenta etc.) to produce their agricultural products. Since these 
private companies are profit maximizing agents, they charged farmers the technology fee 
for the first time use of the seed. Therefore, we defined p (i) as the regular price of seeds 
Xbt (i) and T the technology fee. The expression 
NS ZAA  depicts the technology transfer 
from the North to the South.  A
S
 and A
N
 are the stock of knowledge in the South and the 
stock of knowledge in the North, respectively. In the South we have both producers of 
BT and non-BT crops.  
  Following Either (1982), the production function in the South for the BT 
producing sectors is defined as follow: 
     
             
          
 ∫       
  
 
   
            (3) 
       {
   
  
 
                   
        (4) 
    represents other inputs such as insecticides, fertilizers, manure, and land used in the 
biotech sector in the South.  is the parameter representing a variety of externalities such 
as new pest density, the effect of the insecticides on the ground water (in addition to the 
biotech seed, farmers still have to use some insecticides).  These externalities could be 
considered as decreasing productivity factors in the production of Biotech crops.  
76 
 
 The coefficient 1- bL is the fraction of labor used in the biotech producing sector, 
while the coefficient bL is the fraction of labor used in the non-biotech producing sector. 
The expression (4) implies that biotech seeds        is the amount of capital good i that is 
used and it is a proportion of the stock of knowledge in the South. This production 
function is considered as a production function of a representative farmer in the biotech 
producing sector of a country adopting the technology.  Farmers produce a final product 
by combining human labor, insecticides, fertilizers, manure, and land with different types 
of seeds       , where i ϵ [0,A]. The additive separability of        is a crucial property 
of this production function. It implies that the discoveries of new seeds do not make any 
existing seeds obsolete (Papageorgiou, 2000). For example, the biotech seeds that are 
insects resistant will still be used by farmers when drought resistant seeds are discovered. 
In other words, every type of seeds is necessary for the production of biotech products at 
country level. Under conditions of prefect competition, the potential gains from seeds 
innovation are shared among seeds companies, farmers, consumers and others. As for the 
seeds companies, they earn the technology fee T, in addition to the regular seed prices. 
Farmers find their output increase due the damage control property of the seeds and also 
a reduction in the insectides use. The benefits that go to consumers are very unclear due 
to the influence of consumers’ preferences of biotech products. 
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 The production function of non-BT producers which follows Cobb-Douglas 
specification is defined as follow: 
(5) 
 
  We assume constant returns to scale. The difference between biotech and non-
biotech production functions is that the former is the extended form of the latter. The 
non-biotech production function excludes the externalities, technology spillover, and also 
the capital used is not tied to any stock of knowledge. 
 For simplicity we assume 0 , and then after some algebra the production 
function of BT producers becomes: 
     (6) 
 
 
In order to attain efficiency in production we step up the maximization problem as 
follow: 
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From the FOCs, we end up with: 
)7(
K
L
K
L
K
L
G
G
F
F



      
 
 Equation (7) corresponds to MRTSbt=MRTSnbt, where the efficiency in production is 
achieved. After rearranging (7) the production efficiency will be satisfied under the 
following condition: 
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The variables 
btk and nbtk  are the capital labor ratio used in biotech and non-biotech 
production, respectively.  is the biotech output elasticity of capital and  is the non-
biotech output elasticity of capital. 
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4.2.1.3. Efficiency in the output Market 
 
 In this case the condition MRT=MRS1 =MRS2 need to be satisfied for the market 
to be efficient. Since we have already determined the marginal rate of substitutions 
(MRS) from the consumer problem, we now have to determine the marginal rate of 
transformation (MRT), which is the ratio of marginal cost of producing BT products to 
the marginal cost of producing non-BT products. Let us find the marginal cost of BT 
from the cost minimization problem.  
Minimize: 
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The constant term  
bt  is the marginal cost of producing BT products.  
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Let us find the marginal cost of non-BT products from the Cost minimization problem. 
Minimize: 
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We assume that the price of labor (
Lw ) is identical in the production of BT and non-BT 
products, but the price of capital (
Kw ) is not identical in the production of BT and non-BT 
products. That is: 
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and 
 r= wk + T.  
The capital labor ratios on BT products and non-BT products are defined as follow: 
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Therefore, for efficiency in the output market we should have MRT= MRS1=MRS2 
That is:  
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using the agricultural biotechnology developed by the North American private firms, 
should consider the general equilibrium efficiency conditions  to make sure that the 
adoption of agricultural biotechnology would lead to efficiency in the entire economy. 
 That is, MRS must be equal for all consumers, MRTS must be equal for all farmers, 
and MRT must be equal to MRS for all consumers.   
4.2.1.4. General equilibrium Efficiency Conditions 
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4.2.2 Comparative Statics  
4.2.2.1 Comparative Statics on the Technology fee, T 
 
 The idea is to evaluate the impact of the enforcement of the IPRs in the 
developing countries, when the seed companies charged farmers for the technology. The 
impact is measured by looking at the change in the production of biotech and non-biotech 
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products with respect to the technology fee. Since the fee is charged for the first time use 
of the seed, we have conducted comparative statics analysis. One can argue, as we did in 
the introduction to this paper, that, despite the fact that the technology fee is paid for the 
first time use it might have some dynamic impact on production. However, since we are 
dealing with a short term model, we choose to conduct static analysis. The first step to 
conduct the comparative statics is to linearize the system (I) by taking log of both sides. 
The system becomes: 
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Then, keeping the endogenous variables on the left hand side and sending the exogenous 
variables to the right hand side, we have: 
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The system )(III  can be expressed as the following implicit functions: 
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 To determine the impact of a change in the technology fee on the optimal values 
of the endogenous variables, we take the total derivative of each of the four functions of 
the System  )(III  with respect to T.   
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4.2.2.2 Comparative Statics on Consumer Preferences,  and   
 
 To determine the impact of a change in the consumers preferences on the optimal 
values of the endogenous variables, we take the total derivative of each of the four 
functions of the System  )(III  with respect to  and . 
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Using the method of Cramer the solutions of the system are: 
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4.2.2.3 Comparative Statics on externalities,   
 
 To determine the impact of a change in the externalities on the optimal values of 
the endogenous variables, we take the total derivative of each of the four functions of the 
System  )(III  with respect to   
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4.2.3 Discussion of the Conclusions of the Model 
 
 The results from this model can be applied to several developing countries 
depending on how the production of the agricultural biotechnology is affected by the 
enforcement of the property rights (technology fee), consumer preferences and the 
externalities. Since our model is set up to cover only the production of biotech products, 
our discussion only distinguishes the impact of the technology fee, consumer preferences 
and externalities on the biotech crops production.  The Summary of the results of the 
model for the biotech crops production is presented in Table 4.1 below. 
4.2.3.1 Impact of the technology fee  
 
 The model predicts that the impact of the technology fee charged by the private 
seed companies  on the production of the biotech products depends on several factors:  
the biotech output elasticity of capital )(  , the non-biotech output elasticity of capital (
) ,the preferences ( and ρ)  of  the two consumers considered in the economy, and the 
costs ( TwK  ) of the biotech seeds. 
4.2.3.2 The Impact of the Elasticity of Supply of Capital 
 
For one thing, we see that if non-biotech output elasticity of capital is lower than 
biotech output elasticity of capital (   ), any change in the technology fee will 
positively affect the production of biotech products.  In other words, if we can assume 
that the output elasticity of capital in the biotech production is higher, then an increase in 
the technology fee will increase the output of the biotech crops. That is, biotech 
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producers will increase their production because the contribution of capital to the biotech 
output is higher despite the technology fee.  
In order to grasp the intuition behind this case, let us assume =0.35 and θ=0.65. 
That is, a 1 percent increase in the use of capital would lead to 0.35 percent increase in 
the non-biotech production and 0.65 percent increase in the biotech production. 
Therefore, given that condition, producers of biotech crops could increase their 
production with an increase in the technology fee, and vice versa. In contrast, if non-
biotech output elasticity of capital is greater than biotech output elasticity of capital          
(   ), any change in the technology fee will negatively affect the production of biotech 
products. 
4.2.3.3 Impact of the Consumers Preferences 
 
 For any country to adopt the technology, we need to make sure that consumers 
would appreciate the products and buy them. In our model, the production of the biotech 
products by any country should consider the impact of consumers’ preferences. As you 
can recall, in our model we assume two consumers who each have both biotech and non-
biotech products in their consumption bundle. For example, a husband and wife living in 
the same home may have different preferences for both biotech and non-biotech products. 
The model considers  as the proxy of the elasticity of substitution between biotech and 
non-biotech products for consumer 1 and   for consumer 2. That is, by using the model 
to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint (Arrow et al., 1961), we derive: 
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            (8) 
 The parameters 
1  and 2  are the elasticities of substitution between biotech and 
non-biotech products.  From (8), we can see that the greater the value of the parameter  , 
the greater the degree of substitutability between the two commodities for consumer 1. 
Similarly, the greater the value of the parameter , the greater the degree of 
substitutability between the two commodities for consumer 2.  Our model shows the 
impact of preferences on the production of both commodities through the change in the 
parameters   and . It demonstrates that the magnitude of the impact of the degree of 
substitutability between the two commodities on their productions depends on the factors 
such as output elasticities of capital in biotech and non-biotech productions, the ratio of 
the proportions of the biotech and non-biotech consumed by each consumer, and the 
degree of substitutability between the commodities for both consumers. Since the utility 
function of the two consumers are identical as well as the impact of their preferences on 
the biotech production, we consider only the case of consumer 1, which is analogous to 
that of consumer 2. The case for consumer 1 is divided into four sub-cases presented in 
Table 4.2 below. 
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Sub-case 1 
 The model predicts that if non-biotech output elasticity of capital is lower than 
biotech output elasticity of capital, farmers will be tempted to invest more in biotech 
products. However, if consumer 1 consumes less biotech than non-biotech products the 
degree of substitutability of consumer 1 between biotech and non-biotech products is 
negatively related to the change in the production of biotech. Suppose that the degree of 
substitutability of consumer 1 decreases that is consumer 1 prefers less biotech products 
than non- biotech products. Under these conditions, biotech producing farmers should be 
discouraged in increasing biotech output but in case the preferences of consumer 2 
outweigh that of consumer 1, biotech producer will increase its output. 
Sub-case 2 
 We assume as in the previous case that if non-biotech output elasticity of capital 
is lower than biotech output elasticity of capital, again farmers will be tempted to invest 
more in biotech products.  In addition, if consumer 1consumes more biotech than non-
biotech that is the degree of substitutability increases, farmers will produce more biotech 
products. In economics standpoint, since input capital contribute more in biotech output 
than non-biotech output and consumers also desire more biotech than non-biotech, it will 
make sense for farmers to increase biotech output regardless of the preferences of the 
other consumers.   
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Sub-case 3 
 In this sub-case, we assume that non-biotech output elasticity of capital is greater 
than biotech output elasticity of capital and consumer 1consumes less biotech than non-
biotech. In other words, farmers will be tempted to increase the capital in their non-
biotech production, but since consumer 1 prefers less biotech than non-biotech, a 
decrease in the degree of substitutability will lead to lower production of biotech products 
and vice versa. 
Sub-case 4 
  We assume that non-biotech output elasticity of capital is greater than biotech 
output elasticity of capital and consumer 1consumes more biotech than non-biotech. That 
is, farmers will invest more capital in non-biotech production and the degree of 
substitutability of consumer 1decreases. Under these conditions, the model predicts an 
increase in the production of biotech which conflicts with economic theory. This situation 
can only make economic sense if the preferences of biotech of other consumers in the 
economy outweigh that of consumer 1. 
4.2.3.4 Impact of the externalities 
  
 The production of the biotech products is subject to various externalities 
generated by the technology. These externalities may be the proliferation of the new pests 
causing more damage to the yields, the pollution of the ground water, and the destruction 
of the biodiversity. The effect of such externalities on the productions of the biotech 
products are negative and their size depends solely on biotech output elasticity of capital, 
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total factor productivity and other factors of the model. These factors are in the 
denominator which is already positive. The detailed discussion on the impact of the 
externalities is presented in Table 4.3. 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
 Should the South and EU adopt the Agricultural Biotechnology?  The answer to 
this question is complex when the enforcement of IPRs, consumers’ preferences and 
externalities are to be considered. This paper develops a simple model that describes 
some aspects of the current issues surrounding agricultural biotechnology.  This paper 
then uses the model to determine to what extent developing countries and EU countries 
should produce biotech crops. The results are contingent upon the parameters of the 
model, which include output elasticity of capital in both biotech and non-biotech 
productions, total factor productivity in biotech production, and the ratio of the 
proportions of the biotech and non-biotech products consumed by each consumer.  
Considering the impact of consumers’ preferences on the production of biotech products, 
the results show that higher consumers’ preference of biotech products coupled with the 
higher output elasticity of capital will lead to higher production of biotech products. This 
result lines up with economic theory. As for the impact of the technology fee, biotech 
producers will increase their production when the contribution of capital to the biotech 
output is higher despite the technology fee. The impact of the externalities on the biotech 
production is undoubtedly negative. 
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 The implication of this paper for future research is twofold: First, the results 
predicted by the model are worthy of further investigation by conducting case studies 
using empirical data. The case studies could be done by countries of by farmers in order 
to determine how these results could relate to the actual real world biotech situations. We 
plan to estimate biotech and non- production functions in order to determine the 
estimated values of the output elasticities of capital either per countries of per farmers. 
Second, for this paper to contribute more to our economic knowledge, we plan to conduct 
welfare analysis to determine the impact of technology fees, consumers’ preferences and 
the externalities on the consumers and producer surpluses. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of the Results of the Model: Case of the Biotech Crops Production 
 Results Sign 



T
X btln  
)]1()1)(1)[((2 



TwK
 
Depends on 
   




btXln   
)]1()1)(1[(2
ln
1
1










b
a
 
Depends on 
11,, ba     




btXln   
)1()1)(1[(2
ln
2
2










b
a
 
Depends on 
22 ,, ba   




btXln  
     
0
111
ln

 
 B
 
Depends on   and B 
99 
 
Table 4.2: The Impact of Consumer 1's Preferences on the Biotech Production 
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Table 4.3: The Impact of the Externalities on the Biotech Production 
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Higher TFP in the production of biotech 
means that the technology is substantially 
used, thus the impact of the externalities will 
impede the production on biotech crops. In 
other words, a substantial use of the biotech 
seeds generates more negative externalities 
which cause more damage to the yield. This 
case lines up with the proliferation of new 
pests. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
5.1.  Discussion of Relevance 
 
 Despite powerful economic and political forces that are promoting the benefits of 
the agricultural biotechnology, some countries are still reluctant in adopting it. Why? 
 Farmers in developing countries need some advanced technology to improve their 
output. Also developing economies with predominant agricultural sector need to improve 
their agricultural production in order to gain more from exporting their products to the 
Rest of the World. Several institutions are claiming that agricultural biotechnology 
improves yield, reduces the use of pesticides, increases farmers’ profit, and reduces 
poverty. Traditionally, there is no flawless technology but agricultural biotechnology is 
viewed by some groups of institutions as a perfect technology with solutions to all 
agricultural problems. Of course, agricultural biotechnology does have some benefits 
which should not be overlooked.  However, it is important to consider not only the 
economic benefits but also the more complex and varied social, environmental, health 
and ethical implications of the technology. This dissertation has addressed these issues in 
several ways by looking at more than just economic and direct benefits of the agricultural 
biotechnology. Seed companies which are profit driven economic agents are just claiming 
the positive characteristics of the agricultural biotechnology and are also lobbying several 
research groups to promote the technology without considering any externality that might 
occur in the future. For example, the proliferation of new pests upon the use of biotech 
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seeds, the contamination of ground water by herbicide sprayed, and the heavy debt 
burden on farmers in developing  countries were not expected by the scientists who 
invented the biotech seeds.  However, these situations need to be considered with 
transparency, and seed companies must take a proactive role in addressing the 
information gap associated with their products, through accurate and transparent risk 
communication. Furthermore, Government has to play a crucial role in imposing some 
regulatory restrictions on biotech industries. For example, farmers should be protected 
from the monopoly power of the seed companies. In addition, since consumers have the 
right to know the ingredients in the products they are consuming, Govermnent should 
impose labeling rules of the biotech products. Among other things, this research is 
relevant because it considers the negative externalities associated with the agricultural 
biotechnology. 
5.2. Concluding Remarks 
 
 The issue of negative externality was indirectly investigated by considering the 
impact of pest density on the output mean and output variance in the first essay. The 
results from the stochastic production function show that both biotech varieties and 
insecticides contribute to the increasing yield, while the insecticides experience 
diminishing returns on yield due to ongoing pest densities. Another thing we should 
consider from these results is that additional applications of insectides and extra hours of 
work reduce yield risk, even though they increase costs. Moreover, we found that the 
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yields of the non-biotech crops are almost exempt from the threat of the emerging pests, 
and the use of insecticides was successful in increasing yield for those crops.  
 The impact of consumer preferences was considered in the second essay by 
looking at the trade impact of EU consumer preferences and policy towards biotech 
products. The results show that the impact of EU consumers’ preferences proxied by 
three categories of commodities had significant impact on the imports between EU and 
the Rest of the World. Furthermore, these preferences led to trade diversion on the 
categories of Beverages and Tobacco and that of Animals and Vegetables Oils and Fats. 
In contrast, trade creation was found in the category of Food and Live Animals. The 
impact of the policies was not substantial and cannot be considered as either trade or 
trade diversion.  
 In the third essay, we determine to what extent developing countries and EU 
countries should produce biotech crops. The results are contingent upon the parameters of 
the model, which include output elasticity of capital in both biotech and non-biotech 
productions, total factor productivity in biotech production, and the ratio of the 
proportions of the biotech and non-biotech products consumed by each consumer.  
Considering the impact of consumers’ preferences on the production of biotech products, 
the results show that higher consumers’ preference of biotech products coupled with  
higher output elasticity of capital will lead to higher production of biotech products. This 
result lines up with economic theory. As for the impact of the technology fee, biotech 
producers will increase their production when the contribution of capital to the biotech 
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output is higher despite the technology fee. The impact of the externalities on the biotech 
production is undoubtedly negative. 
5.3. Shortcomings and Future Research 
 This dissertation does have some limits. For example, the first essay shows the 
impact of new pests on crops yield, but this was just indirect evidence in the sense that 
the data of pest density was not used. Pest density was proxied by additional sprays of 
insecticides and extra hours of work due to the presence of new pests. We plan to use pest 
population in our regression upon the availability of pest density data. Moreover, the 
damage control production function will be used in order to determine yield loss in the 
presence of new pests when farmers apply damage control agents like biotech seeds and 
insecticides. 
 The second essay, in which gravity model of international trade was used to 
capture trade consequences of the EU restrictive trade policy, is the starting point of our 
research agenda. In this essay, we fail to capture the trade effect of EU restrictive trade 
policy towards biotechnology. The estimates of the policy variable are negative but not 
significant. Also, we found trade creation in the category of Food and Live Animals. 
These results conflict with our expectations. We thus plan to break down the data into 
more than three categories of the commodities. Furthermore, intra EU and growth 
implications will be investigated as well as the export loss of developing adopting 
countries. 
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 The shortcoming of the third essay is that seed companies were not considered as 
an economic agent in the general equilibrium model, and there were also lack of practical 
analyses. We also made many unrealistic assumptions in order to make the model 
tractable. The implication of this essay for future research is twofold: First, seed 
companies will be considered as a third economic agent. Second, empirical investigations 
will be conducted through case studies for some selected countries and we hope to 
eventually develop a more realistic model in order to more confidently determine the 
optimum level of consumption and production for specific countries, as well as offer 
some  plausible level of welfare analysis. 
 
